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Abstract
We construct, estimate and explore the monetary policy consequences of a New Key-
nesian (NK) behavioural model with bounded-rationality and heterogeneous agents. We
radically depart from most existing models of this genre in our treatment of bounded ratio-
nality and learning. Instead of the usual Euler learning approach, we assume that agents
are internally rational (IR) given their beliefs of aggregate states and prices. The model is
inhabited by fully rational (RE) and IR agents where the latter use simple heuristic rules
to forecast aggregate variables exogenous to their micro-environment. We find that IR re-
sults in an NK model with more persistence and a smaller policy space for rule parameters
that induce stability and determinacy. In the most general form of the model, agents learn
from their forecasting errors by observing and comparing them with those under RE making
the composition of the two types endogenous. In a Bayesian estimation with fixed propor-
tions of RE and IR agents and a general heuristic forecasting rule we find that a pure IR
model fits the data better than the pure RE case. However, the latter with imperfect rather
than the standard perfect information assumption outperforms IR (easily) and RE-IR com-
posites (slightly), but second moment comparisons suggest that the RE-IR composite can
match data better. Our findings suggest that Kalman-filtering learning with RE can match
bounded-rationality in matching persistence seen in the data.
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1 Introduction
This paper constructs, estimates and explores the monetary policy consequences of a New
Keynesian (NK) behavioural model with bounded-rationality and heterogeneous agents. It
departs from existing models of this genre in its approach to bounded rationality and learning.
There are broadly two choices made by the learning literature at this point: Euler learning
or internal rationality. The first, Euler learning (EL), follows the pioneering work of Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) and assumes, in the case of households, that agents forecast their own
consumption decision next period. Furthermore they know the minimum state variable (MSV)
form of the equilibrium (equivalent to the saddle-path under rational expectations) and use
direct observations or VAR estimates of these states to update their estimates each period
using a discounted least-squares estimator. Then a statistical learning equilibrium is one where
this perceived law of motion and the actual one coincide. For firms the same applies except the
decision is on prices made by firms who are no longer locked into a contract.
Although this form of bounded rationality responds to what many regard as an extreme
assumption of model-consistent expectations, the departure is only a modest one in that agents
still need to know the MSV form of the equilibrium. The defining characteristic of behavioural
macro-models is to limit the cognitive skills of at least a group of agents in the model and this
is achieved by introducing simple ‘heuristic’ learning rules. However this raises the opposite
concern regarding the bounds on bounded rationality: with heuristic rules agents may fall
considerably short of building rational expectations and such models are particularly vulnerable
to the Lucas critique when policy scenarios are studied. The problem is that agents can depart
from rationality in an infinite number of ways leading into the ‘wilderness’ of Sims (1980).
In response to the wilderness concern, the literature on behavioural models adopts a basic
general framework pioneered by Brock and Hommes (1997). To limit the departure from ra-
tionality and rule out stupid behaviour the approach of reinforcement learning proposes that,
although adaptation can be slow and there can be a random component of choice, the higher
the ‘payoff’ (defined appropriately) from taking an action in the past, the more likely it will be
taken in the future.1
The alternative approach to learning adopted in this paper assumes that agents are inter-
nally rational (IR) given their beliefs of aggregate states and prices which are exogenous to
their decisions.2 As with the Euler equation approach, agents cannot form model-consistent
expectations and instead learn about these variables using their knowledge of the MSV form
of the equilibrium. The two approaches then differ with respect to what agents learn about -
their own decisions in the first approach, and variables exogenous to the agents in the second
1See Young (2004) for a general treatment of this approach.
2See Adam and Marcet (2011) who apply the concept to asset-pricing, Eusepi and Preston (2011) for an
RBC model with IR, Woodford (2013) who adopts a similar NK framework as in this paper and Branch and
McGough (2016) for a recent discussion of of IR, also referred to as the ‘infinite time-horizon approach to learning’.
We adopt the general definition of internal rationality used in the first paper: namely that “agents maximize
utility under uncertainty, given their constraints and given a consistent set of probability beliefs about payoff-
relevant variables that are beyond their control or external”. Then beliefs can take the form of a well-defined
probability measure over a stochastic process (the ‘fully Bayesian’ plan), or they can adopt an ‘anticipated utility’
framework of Kreps (1998). Adam and Marcet (2011) adopt the former approach whereas this paper and the
other applications mentioned adopt the latter. Cogley and Sargent (2008) compares the two and encouragingly
find that anticipated utility can be seen as a good approximation to fully Bayesain optimization.
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approach.3
Proceeding to the linearization about a deterministic steady state, as is usual in the litera-
ture, we show that if we require non-rational agents in the model to forecast only macro-variables
exogenous to their decision rules, EL of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) then makes two implicit
assumptions: agents (1) know they are all identical and (2) observe the state vector including
the shock processes. Our formulation, by contrast, makes neither of these assumptions. We
adopt heuristic rules for IR agents which can be thought of as parsimonious forms of forecasting
rules (as in Branch and Evans (2011)) which, for sophisticated agents, would take the form of
high-order VARs. This, we argue, fits well the behavioural approach of assuming agents in the
model with limited cognitive skills.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: first, we start with the full non-linear
formulation to provide rigorous foundations for NK behavioural models based on rational ex-
pectations (RE) or internal rationality (IR) without assumptions (1) and (2) above; second, we
examine empirically the support for a composite RE-IR model of the Brock-Hommes variety by
Bayesian estimation; third, in our comparisons of different composites including the pure RE
and IR cases, we impose what we term informational consistency where RE and IR agents in
the model share the same information as the econometrician estimating the model.
The nearest paper to ours is Massaro (2013) which presents a calibrated composite het-
erogeneous expectations model of RE and IR-anticipated-utility agents. As in our paper he
emphasizes the need for policymakers to design robust rules that stabilize the economy across
different composite models; but here we focus on the informational assumptions made by the
two sets of agents and we seek empirical support for the modelling choices. We also relax an
implied assumption in his and other models of this genre, that the two groups of agents do not
lend to each other thus leading to a wealth distribution.4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the standard linear NK
RE model used in the literature and then proceeds to the Brock-Hommes composite model of
rational and boundedly rational agents. Section 3 goes back to the non-linear foundations of
the model and demonstrates why assumption (1) above is required in the Euler learning set-up.
Section 4 examines the information assumptions that are made explicitly or implicitly in the
RE and boundedly rational forms of the NK model. Section 5 sets out our IR model with
heuristic adaptive expectations forecasting rules. Then Section 6 provides numerical results
on the dynamic properties of three possible models of expectations, rational (RE), boundedly
rational with Euler learning (EL) and boundedly but internally rational (IR).5 This section
assumes homogeneous expectations for which all agents (households and firms) form either RE or
IR or EL or expectations. Then in Section 7 we introduce heterogeneity in a full Brock-Hommes
NK model with a composite model of IR and RE agents allowing for a wealth distribution
between the two groups. Section 8 estimates the latter, alongside the pure IR and RE models by
Bayesian methods, and conducts a likelihood race. This section estimates the behavioural model
3See Graham (2011) for a discussion of this distinction.
4IR also fits into the Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) framework: Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2014) introduce
forward-looking optimizing agents into an ABM model. They use essentially the IR concept which they refer to
as constructive rational decision-making. This results in a novel AB macro-model in having internally rational
optimizers: households maximize expected intertemporal utility over an infinite time-horizon and firms do the
same with their utility being taken as profit.
5Jump and Levine (2017) provides analytical results for stability.
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in which the adaptive expectations assumption used by IR agents is generalized to a heuristic
forecasting rule. The section provides alternative estimation results imposing different fixed
proportions of rational agents. It first assumes RE agents have perfect information regarding
current state variables. Then it adds an additional learning mechanism assuming that RE
agents do not observe all current state variables and only have an imperfect information set.
Section 9 examines the ability of these estimated variants of the NK model to match the second
moments in the data. Section 10 examines the impulse response functions of the estimated
model and discusses endogenous persistence. Section 11 concludes the paper. A summary of
the full non-linear model is set out in a separate on-line Appendix which also contains details
of the estimation results and the imperfect information solution procedure.
2 The Standard NK Behavioural Model
This section discusses the standard New Keynesian behavioural model framework used by Jang
and Sacht (2012), Jang and Sacht (2014), De Grauwe (2012a), De Grauwe (2012b), Branch and
McGough (2010), Massaro (2013), Cornea et al. (2014), Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) and others.
2.1 The Workhorse NK Model
We first set out the most basic three-equation linearized workhorse NK model with RE
yt = Etyt+1 − (rn,t − Etpit+1) + u1,t (1)
pit = βEtpit+1 + λyt + u2,t (2)
rn,t = ρrrn,t−1 + (1− ρr)(θpipit + θyyt) + u3,t (3)
where yt, pit and rn,t are the output gap, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate re-
spectively. All variables are expressed in log-deviation form about the steady state. The shock
processes ui,t , i = 1, 2, 3 should be interpreted as exogenous shocks to demand (or preferences),
the supply side and monetary policy respectively and are usually AR(1) processes.6 Expecta-
tions up to now are formed assuming RE and perfect information of the state vector (which
includes the shock processes). Equation (1) is the linearized Euler equation for consumption
which is equated with output in equilibrium (there is no government expenditure). (2) is the
NK Phillips curve and (3) is the nominal interest rate rule in ‘implementable form’ in that it
responds to output relative to the steady state rather than the output gap.
Before relaxing the RE assumption two points about this formulation need to be made.
First, there are no the lagged term in yt in the demand curve (1) nor a lagged term in pit
in the Phillips curve (2). These can enter through the introduction of external habit in the
consumers’ utility function and price indexing respectively. But we choose to focus on learning
as a persistence mechanism, so both these features are omitted. Second, the linearization even
without these persistence terms is only correct about a zero-inflation steady state.
6In fact, the supply side shock is a composite of technology and marginal cost processes in the model developed
in this paper. The AR(1) feature of shock processes is criticized by De Grauwe (2012b) as it implies persistence is
exogenously generated. This paper addresses this critique in developing strong endogenous mechanisms through
learning.
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2.2 The Brock-Hommes Behavioural NK Model
In the Brock-Hommes framework, which we later follow, the model becomes behavioural by a
departure from the RE assumption and the introduction of two groups of agents. One group is
rational and the other forms expectations through simple ‘heuristic’ learning rules. RE agents
form model-consistent expectations fully aware of the existence of IR agents in the composite
model. General adaptive learning rules7 that encompass those adopted by Brock and Hommes
(1997), Hommes (2013), Branch and McGough (2010), De Grauwe (2012b), and De Grauwe
(2012a) are
E∗t yt+1 = E∗t−1yt + λy(yt−j − E∗t−1yt) ; λy ∈ [0, 1], j = 0, 1 (4)
E∗tpit+1 = E∗t−1pit + λpi(pit−j − E∗t−1pit) ; λpi ∈ [0, 1], j = 0, 1 (5)
where we can in principle allow for both current and lagged observations of output and inflation,
j = 0, 1, respectively. Throughout the rest of the paper we make the following information
assumptions: for observations of aggregate output and inflation, j = 1, which is assumed in
the EL approach. Later in the IR approach we need to model observations of market-specific
variables consisting of factor prices, profits and marginal costs. These we assume can be observed
without a lag and therefore j = 0.
Let ny,t, npi,t be the proportions of rational agents forecasting output and inflation respec-
tively. The IS and NK equations then become
yt = ny,tEtyt+1 + (1− ny,t)E∗t yt+1 − [rn,t − (npi,tEtpit+1 + (1− npi,t)E∗tpit+1)] + u1,t (6)
pit = β[npi,tEtpit+1 + (1− npi,t)E∗tpit+1] + λ(yt − yFt ) + u2,t (7)
To complete the model we need expressions for the weights ny,t and npi,t. These follow the
reinforcement learning literature by choosing probabilities
nx,t =
exp(−γΦREx,t ({xt}))
exp(−γΦREx,t ({xt})) + exp(−γΦAEx,t ({xt}))
(8)
where ΦREx,t ({xt)}) and ΦAEx,t ({xt)}) are ‘fitness’ measures respectively of the forecast performance
of the rational and non-rational predictor of outcome {xt} = {yt}, {pit} given by a discounted
least squares error predictor
ΦREx,t ({xt}) = µREΦREx,t−1({xt}) + (1− µRE)([xt − Et−1 xt]2 + Cx) (9)
ΦAEx,t ({xt}) = µAEΦAEx,t−1({xt}) + (1− µAE)[xt−j − E∗t−1−j xt−1]2 ; j = 0, 1 (10)
where Cx represents the relative costs of being rational in learning about variable xt. Thus the
proportion of rational agents in the steady state is given by
nx =
exp(−γCx)
exp(−γCx) + 1
7Anufriev et al. (2015) provide lab-based support for such rules.
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which is pinned down by the γCx. Equations (3) and (4) – (10) constitute the linearized NK
behavioural model.8
3 The Non-Linear New Keynesian Model
So far in the linearized model the justification for the form of adaptive forecasts needs to be
established. In order to address this we step back to the underlying non-linear model and
introduce the distinction between internal decisions and aggregate macro-variables. We start
with the non-linear RE model and proceed from full to bounded rationality in stages.
3.1 Households
Household j chooses between work and leisure and therefore how much labour it supplies. Let
Ct(j) be consumption and Ht(j) be the proportion of this available for work or leisure spent
at the former. The single-period utility we choose, compatible with a balanced growth steady
state, is
Ut(j) = U(Ct(j), Ht(j)) = log(Ct(j))− Ht(j)
1+φ
1 + φ
and the value function of the representative household at time t dependent on its assets B is
given by
Vt(j) = Vt(Bt−1(j)) = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βsU(Ct+s(j), Ht+s(j))
]
(11)
The household’s problem at time t is to choose paths for consumption {Ct(j)}, labour supply
{Ht(j)} and holdings of financial savings to maximize Vt(j) given by (11) given its budget
constraint in period t
Bt(j) = RtBt−1(j) +WtHt(j) + Γt − Ct(j)− Tt (12)
where Bt(j) is the given net stock of financial assets at the end of period t, Wt is the wage rate,
Tt are lump-sum taxes, Γt are profits from wholesale and retail firms owned by households and
Rt is the real interest rate paid on assets held at the beginning of period t given by
Rt =
Rn,t−1
Πt
where Rn,t and Πt are the nominal interest and inflation rates respectively. Wt, Rn,t, Πt and Γt
are all exogenous to household j. As usual all real variables are expressed relative to the price
of final output. The standard first order conditions are
Et [Λt,t+1(j)Rt+1] = 1
8De Grauwe (2012b), and De Grauwe (2012a) construct a rather different composite EL-type model consisting
of ‘fundamentalist’ rather than rational agents alongside adaptive learners. For the former RE E(·) are replaced
with Efyt+1 = yFt and Efpit+1 = 0. Thus fundamentalists always believe next period’s output gap is zero and
the net inflation rate will return to its steady-state value of zero. The same author also assumes Cx = 0 in (9).
Aurissergues (2017) studies a composite model closer to that in our paper, but again in an EL framework, where
non-RE agents learn the autocorrelation of endogenous variables. He shows that these agents can actually form
better forecasts and dominate in the long run through switching.
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UH,t(j)
UC,t(j)
= −Wt
where Λt,t+1(j) ≡ β UC,t+1(j)UC,t(j) is the stochastic discount factor for household j, over the interval
[t, t+ 1]. For our choice of utility function UC,t =
1
Ct
and UH,t = −Hφt so these become
1
Ct(j)
= βEt
[
Rt+1
Ct+1(j)
]
(13)
Ct(j)Ht(j)
φ = Wt ⇒ Ht(j) =
(
Wt
Ct(j)
) 1
φ
(14)
We now express the solution in a form suitable for moving from a RE to a learning equilibrium.
Solving (12) forward in time and imposing the transversality condition on debt we can write
Bt−1(j) = PVt(Ct(j))− PVt(WtHt(j))− PVt(Γt) + PVt(Tt) (15)
where the present (expected) value of a series {Xt+i}∞i=0 at time t is defined by
PVt(Xt) ≡ Et
∞∑
i=0
Xt+i
Rt,t+i
=
Xt
Rt
+
1
Rt
PVt+1(Xt+1) (16)
writing Rt,t+i ≡ RtRt+1Rt+2 · · ·Rt+i as the real interest rate over the interval [t− 1, t+ i].
The forward-looking budget constraint (15) holds for the representative household. In ag-
gregate because agents only borrow from or lend to one another there is no net debt so Bt−1 = 0.
Then in a symmetric equilibrium with Ct(j) = Ct and Ht(j) = Ht, (15) and (14) become
PVt(Ct) = PVt
W 1+ 1φt
C
1
φ
t
+ PVt(Γt)− PVt(Tt)
Ht =
(
Wt
Ct
) 1
φ
Solving (13) forward in time and using the law of iterated expectation we have for i ≥ 1
1
Ct
= βiEt
[
Rt+1,t+i
Ct+i
]
; i ≥ 1 (17)
We now express the solution to the household optimization problem for Ct and Ht that
are functions of point expectations {E∗tWt+i}∞i=1, {E∗tRt+1,t+i}∞i=1 and {E∗tΓt+i}∞i=0 treated as
exogenous processes given at time t. With point expectations we use (17) to obtain the following
optimal decision for Ct+i given point expectations E∗tRt+1,t+i
Ct+i = Ctβ
iE∗tRt+1,t+i ; i ≥ 1 (18)
E∗t (Wt+iHt+i) =
(E∗tWt+i)
1+ 1
φ
C
1
φ
t+i
(19)
Substituting (18) and (19) into the forward-looking household budget constraint, using
∑∞
i=0 β
i =
6
1
1−β and E
∗
tRt,t+i = RtE∗tRt+1,t+i for i ≥ 1 , we arrive at
Ct
(1− β) =
1
C
1
φ
t
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t +
∞∑
i=1
(β
1
φ )−i
(
E∗tWt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
)1+ 1
φ
)
+ Γt − Tt +
∞∑
i=1
E∗t (Γt+i − Tt+i))
E∗tRt+1,t+i
which can be written in recursive form as
Ct
(1− β) =
1
C
1
φ
t
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t + Ω1,t
)
+ Γt − Tt + Ω2,t (20)
Ω1,t ≡
∞∑
i=1
(β
1
φ )−i
(
E∗tWt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
)1+ 1
φ
= (β
1
φ )−1
(
E∗tWt+1
E∗tRt+1,t+1
)1+ 1
φ
+
Ω1,t+1
β
1
φE∗tRt+1
Ω2,t ≡
∞∑
i=1
E∗t (Γt+i − Tt+i)
E∗tRt+1,t+i
=
E∗t (Γt+1 − Tt+1)
E∗tRt+1,t+1
+
Ω2,t+1
E∗tRt+1
Consumption is then given by (20) assuming point expectations or by the symmetric form
of the Euler equation (13) under full rationality (i.e. households know symmetric nature of
equilibrium with Ct(j) = Ct). Ct is a function of non-rational point expectations {E∗tWt+i}∞i=1,
{E∗tRt,t+i}∞i=i and {E∗tΓt+i}∞i=1 treated as exogenous processes given at time t as opposed to ratio-
nal model-consistent expectations {EtWt+i}∞i=0 etc. Since Etf(Xt) ≈ f(Et(Xt)); Etf(XtYt)) ≈
f(Et(Xt)Et(Yt)) up to a first-order Taylor-series expansion, assuming point expectations is
equivalent to using a linear approximation (given below) as is usually done in the literature.
3.2 Firms
Wholesale firms employ a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce a homogeneous output
Y Wt = F (At, Ht) = AtH
α
t
where At is total factor productivity. Profit-maximizing demand for labour results in the first
order condition
Wt =
PWt
Pt
FH,t = α
PWt
Pt
Y Wt
Ht
(21)
The retail sector costlessly converts a homogeneous wholesale good into a basket of differentiated
goods for aggregate consumption
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(m)
(ζ−1)/ζdm
)ζ/(ζ−1)
(22)
where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. For each m, the consumer chooses Ct(m) at a price
Pt(m) to maximize (22) given total expenditure
∫ 1
0 Pt(m)Ct(m)dm. Assuming government ser-
vices are similarly differentiated, this results in a set of demand equations for each differentiated
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good m with price Pt(m) of the form
Yt(m) =
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)−ζ
Yt (23)
where Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(m)
1−ζdm
] 1
1−ζ
. Pt is the aggregate price index. Ct and Pt are Dixit-Stigliz
aggregates – see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that
the price of each retail good m is set optimally to POt (m). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is held fixed. For each retail producer m, given its real marginal cost MCt =
PWt
Pt
, the
objective is at time t to choose {POt (m)} to maximize discounted real profits
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
Yt+k(m)
[
POt (m)− Pt+kMCt+k
]
subject to (23), where Λt,t+k ≡ βk UC,t+kUC,t is the stochastic discount factor over the interval
[t, t+ k]. The solution to this is standard and give by
POt (m)
Pt
=
ζ
ζ − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
ζ Yt+kMCt+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k (Πt,t+k)
ζ (Πt,t+k)
−1 Yt+k
Denoting the numerator and denominator by Jt and JJt respectively, and introducing a mark-up
shock MSt to MCt, we write in recursive form
POt (m)
Pt
=
Jt
JJt
(24)
Jt − ξEt[Λt,t+1Πζt+1Jt+1] =
1
1− 1ζ
YtMCtMSt (25)
JJt − ξEt[Λt,t+1Πζ−1t+1JJt+1] = Yt (26)
(see the lemma in Appendix C). Using the fact that all resetting firms will choose the same
price, by the Law of Large Numbers we can find the evolution of inflation given by
1 = ξ (Πt−1,t)ζ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
POt
Pt
)1−ζ
(27)
Price dispersion lowers aggregate output as follows. Market clearing in the labour market gives
Ht =
n∑
m=1
Ht(m) =
n∑
m=1
(
Yt(m)
At
) 1
α
=
(
Yt
At
) 1
α
n∑
m=1
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)− ζ
α
using (23). Hence equilibrium for good m gives
Yt =
Y Wt
∆αt
(28)
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where price dispersion is defined by
∆t ≡
(
n∑
m=1
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)− ζ
α
)
Assuming as before that the number of firms is large we obtain the following dynamic relation-
ship:
∆t = ξΠ
ζ
α
t ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)− ζ
α
(29)
3.3 Closing the Model
To close the model we first require total profits from retail and wholesale firms, Γt, is remitted
to households. This is given in real terms by
Γt = Yt − P
W
t
Pt
Y Wt︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail
+
PWt
Pt
Y Wt −WtHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wholesale
= Yt − αP
W
t
Pt
Y Wt
using the first-order condition (21). Then to complete closure we have resource and balanced
government budget constraints:
Yt = Ct +Gt
Gt = Tt
where Gt is an exogenous demand process, and a monetary policy rule for the nominal interest
rate given by the following implementable Taylor-type rule:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θpi log
(
Πt
Πtarg,t
)
+ θy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
Yt
Yt−1
))
+ MP,t (30)
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + A,t
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + G,t
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + MS,t
log Πtarg,t − log Π = ρpi(log Πtarg,t−1 − log Π) + pitarg ,t
and MP,t is an i.i.d. shock to monetary policy. Πtarg,t is a time-varying inflation target following
an AR(1) process. This completes the model.
3.4 Recovering the NK Workhorse Model
We now pose the question: can the linearized form of the non-linear model about the steady state
reduce to the standard workhorse model in Section 2.1 where rational expectations Etyt+1 and
Etpit+1 or non-RE E∗t yt+1 and E∗tpit+1 can be treated as expectations by individual households
and firms respectively of aggregate future output and inflation respectively? To answer this
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consider the linearized form of the above set-up about a zero inflation and growth deterministic
steady state. With RE the household j’s first order conditions take one of two forms. Either:
α1ct(j) = α2wt + α3(ω2,t + rt) + α4ω1,t (31)
ω1,t = α5Etwt+1 − α6Etrt+1 + βEtω1,t+1
ω2,t = (1− β)(γt − gt)− rt + βEtω2,t+1
γt =
1
γy
yt − α
γy
(wt + ht)
from (20) where lower case variables xt ≡ log(Xt/X) where X is the steady state of Xt; cy ≡ CY ,
γy ≡ ΓY , gy ≡ GY and γt is exogenous profit per household (a function of aggregate consumption
and hours). Positive coefficients are given by α1 ≡ 1 + αφcy , α2 ≡ (1 − β)(1 + 1φ) αcy , α3 ≡
γy
cy
,
α4 ≡ βαcy , α5 ≡ (1− β)(1 + 1φ) and α6 ≡ (1 + 1φ).
Alternatively from the Euler equation (13):
ct(j) = Etct+1(j)− Etrt+1 (32)
If now we make the assumption that households are identical and know this symmetric nature of
the equilibrium then we have that Etct+1(j) = Etct+1 which is now an expectation of a variable
exogenous to household j. Then in a symmetric equilibrium.
ct = Etct+1 − Etrt+1 (33)
Linearizing the household supply of hours decision, the resource constraint and the Fisher
equation we have,
yt = (1− gy)ct + gygt (34)
rt = rn,t−1 − pit + rst−1 (35)
ht =
1
φ
(wt − ct)
Then in a special case where Gt = 0 and there is no distinction between public and private
consumption, gy = 0 and yt = ct. Equations (33)–(35) with rst = u1,t reduces to (1) where
Etyt+1 is the forecast of aggregate output. With RE using (31) or (32) results in the same
equilibrium, but under bounded rationality with the same beliefs considered below this is no
longer the case.
Turning to the supply side, for the wholesale sector:
yt = at + αht
mct = wt − yt + ht
For retail firm m, linearizing (24)–(26) and (27) about a zero net equation steady state we have:
pot (m)− pt = βξEt[pit+1 + pot+1(m)− pt+1] + (1− βξ)(mct +mst) (36)
ξpit = (1− ξ)(pot − pt) (37)
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Solving forward
pot (m)− pt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(βξ)i[βξpit+i+1 + (1− βξ)(mct+i +mst+i)]
Then in a symmetric equilibrium we have
pit =
(1− ξ)
ξ
(
Et
∞∑
i=0
(βξ)i[βξpit+i+1 + (1− βξ)(mct+i +mst+i)]
)
(38)
where Et[pit+i+1] and Et[mct+i+mst+i] are expectations of aggregate inflation and real marginal
costs, both variables exogenous to individual price-setters. However, if we assume price-setters
know they are identical then we can use (37) to obtain
pot (m)− pt = pot − pt =
ξ
(1− ξ)pit
Then substituting back into (36) we arrive at
pit =
(1− ξ)(1− βξ)
ξ
E∗t
∞∑
i=0
βi(mct+i +mst+i) (39)
which omits learning about aggregate inflation. (39) is the familiar linearized Phillips curve.
Under RE, (38) and (39) are equivalent. Putting mct = wt− at + ht = (1 + φ)ht = (1 + φ)(yt−
at)/α, (39) in recursive form gives (2) with λ =
(1−ξ)(1−βξ)(1+φ)
αξ and u2,t = λmst.
To summarize, the ‘Euler Learning’ form of the workhorse linearized model expressed in
terms of expectations of aggregate output (or the output gap) and inflation is valid under
bounded rationality provided that individual households and price-setting firms know the sym-
metric nature of the equilibrium. Then Euler learning is equivalent to internal rationality. If
we drop this assumption, then (31) and (38) must be used given non-RE beliefs of these same
aggregates and in addition expectations of the wage rate, interest rate, profits and government
spending. This will be the form of the model we use under internal rationality.
4 Perfect versus Imperfect Information
We now examine the information assumptions that are made explicitly or implicitly in the RE
and boundedly rational forms of the NK model. In linearized form of the NK model this can
has a state-space form:[
zt+1
Etxt+1
]
= E
[
zt
xt
]
+
[
F
0
]
t+1 ; wt = G
[
zt
xt
]
(40)
where zt is a (n−m)×1 vector of predetermined variables at time t with z0 given, xt, is a m×1
vector of non-predetermined variables and wt is a vector observable macro-economic variables
which when we come to estimation will be the data used by the econometrician. All variables
are expressed as proportional deviations about a steady state. E, F and G are fixed matrices,
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t as a vector of random zero-mean shocks. RE under perfect information are formed assuming
a full information set {zs, xs, s}, s ≤ t, E, F,G.
We now proceed to the assumption that there are non-rational agents who are unable to form
model-consistent expectations. For such agents, in the learning literature pioneered by Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) learning rules are specified in terms of the minimum state variable
representation of the perfect information model-consistent solution to (40). If the number
of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables,
the system has a unique equilibrium which is also stable with saddle-path xt = −Nzt where
N = N(D) and depends on the rule (see Blanchard and Kahn (1980); Currie and Levine (1993)).
Instability (indeterminacy) occurs when the number of eigenvalues of E outside the unit circle
is larger (smaller) than the number of non-predetermined variables.
Partitioning E conformably with zt and xt, the RE perfect information solution takes the
form of a first-order VAR
zt = [E11 − E12N ]zt−1 + Ft (41)
xt = −Nzt (42)
Etxt+1 = −NEtzt+1 = −N [E11 − E12N ]zt (43)
In the learning literature with ‘Euler-learning’ (also termed by Ellison and Pearlman (2011)
as ‘saddle-path learning’) agents are the assumed to make their forecast (43) by using (41) to
estimate a first order VAR in zt. As we have seen this implies that agents know they are all
identical. But perfect information makes a further assumption that agents observe the state
vector including the shock processes.
We now express learning rules in terms of a subset of wt = [yt, pit, rn,t]
′. Observing these
three time-series under RE enables agents (and the econometrician) to back out the shocks and
to express wt as an infinite VAR (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007) and Levine et al. (2012)).
To show this write the RE solution as the following ARMA process
zt = Azt−1 +Bt (44)
wt = Czt−1 +Dt (45)
Because we have three shocks and three observables, the matrix D is square. Assume now
it is also non-singular which is only possible if wt are observations without lags. Then t =
D−1(wt − Czt−1) and substituting into (44) and denoting the lag operator by L, we have
[(I − (A−BD−1C)L]zt = BD−1wt (46)
Hence combining (41) – (46) we have
zt =
∞∑
i=0
(A−BD−1C)iBD−1wt−i (47)
wt = C
∞∑
i=1
(A−BD−1C)iBD−1wt−i +Dt (48)
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Convergence of the summations in (47) and (48) requires that the matrix (A−BD−1C) has all
eigenvalues within the unit circle. Then equation (48) is an infinite VAR for the three observables
wt = [yt, pit, rn,t]
′ which is estimatable from output, inflation and interest rate data.9 It follows
that the RE forecast is:
Etwt+1 = C
∞∑
i=0
(A−BD−1C)iBD−1wt−i (49)
whereas the adaptive heuristic rules (4) and (5) are parsimonious representations of (49):
E∗t yt+1 =
∞∑
i=0
λiyyt−i ; or E∗t yt+1 =
∞∑
i=1
λiyyt−i
E∗tpit+1 =
∞∑
i=0
λipipit−i ; or E∗tpit+1 =
∞∑
i=1
λipipit−i
Thus we can interpret the heuristic rules as parsimonious forecasting models in which non-
rational agents choose under-parameterized predictors (see Branch and Evans (2011)).
We conclude that unless shock processes are either known or observed then at best with the
number of shocks equal to the number of observables and no lags in the latter, a well-specified
forecasting rule in the form of an infinite VAR is available and may be e-stable converging to
the RE equilibrium.10 Otherwise the ARMA solution (44)–(45) is not invertible. In fact none
of these conditions are satisfied in the set-up we consider when we come to estimation: we have
more shocks than observables and our heuristic rules assume aggregate variables are observed
with a lag. Thus if we are to compare like with like, rational agents also observe with a lag and
we must therefore solve under imperfect information. We return to this issue in Section 8.
5 Internal Rationality
With internal rationality and anticipated utility (also known as the ‘infinite horizon approach’),
our model of learning is one in which agents are rational regarding their internal decisions, but
have no macroeconomic model to form expectations of aggregate variables. We draw a clear
distinction between aggregate and internal quantities so that identical agents in our model are
not aware of this equilibrium property (nor any others). We now drop the key assumption for
Euler learning that agents know they are all identical.
We utilize the internal household and retail firm decision rules set out in Section 3.4. To
close the model, we need to specify the manner in which internally rational households and
firms form their expectations. To do so, we assume that variables which are local to the agents,
in a geographical sense, are observable within the period, whereas variables that are strictly
macroeconomic are only observable with a lag. This categorization regarding information about
the current state of the economy follows Nimark (2014). He distinguishes between the local
information that agents acquire directly through their interactions in markets and statistics
9If this matrix is not stable, then the Spectral Factorization Theorem states that provided A is a stable matrix,
then there exists an infinite VAR representation; but in this case the estimated shocks are not the fundamental
ones t. See Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007) for an example.
10Approximating the infinite lag with a finite one introduces a further degree of missecification.
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that are collected and summarised, usually by governments, and made available to the wider
public.11 The only exception to this is the nominal interest rate, which we assume is observable
within the period given the timing structure of NK models. Given this, we assume a strict form
of naive expectations. Thus internally rational household expectations are given by
E∗t rt+1 = rn,t − E∗tpit+1 (50)
E∗t rt+i = rn,t+i−1 − E∗tpit+i ; i ≥ 2 (51)
E∗t rn,t+i = E∗t rn,t+1 ; i ≥ 1 (52)
E∗h,tpit+i = E∗h,tpit+1 ; i ≥ 1 (53)
E∗twt+i = E∗twt+1 ; i ≥ 1 (54)
E∗tγt+i = E∗tγt+1 ; i ≥ 1 (55)
Then expressing Etω1,t+1 and Etω2,t+1 in (31) as forward-looking summations and using (50)–
(55), we arrive at the IR consumption equation
α1ct = α2wt + α3(ω2,t + rt) + α4ω1,t
ω1,t =
1
1− β [α5E
∗
twt+1 − α6(βE∗t rn,t+1 − E∗tpit+1)]− α6rn,t
ω2,t = (1− β)(γt − gt)− rt + β
1− β ((1− β)(E
∗
tγt+1 − E∗t gt+1)− E∗t rt+1)
which is now expressed in terms of one-step ahead forecasts by
E∗txt+1 = E∗txt + λx(xt−j − E∗txt) ; x = w, rn, pi, γ ; j = 0, 1
Internally rational households make rational inter-temporal decisions for their consumption and
hours supplied given adaptive expectations of the wage rate, the nominal interest rate, inflation
and profits. These macro-variables may in principle be observed with or without a one-period
lag (j = 1, 0), but as stated earlier we assume j = 0 for market-specific variables wt, γt, and
j = 1 for aggregate inflation pit. However we assume the current nominal interest rate, rn,t is
announced and therefore also observed without a lag.
For retail firm m with adaptive expectations
E∗tpit+i+1 = E∗tpit+1 ; i ≥ 0
E∗t (mct+i +mst+i) = E∗t (mct+1 +mst+1) ; i ≥ 1
so that
pot (m)− pt =
βξ
1− βE
∗
f,tpit+1 + (1− βξ)(mct +mst) +
β
1− βE
∗
t (mct+1 +mst+1)
One-step ahead forecasts are given by
E∗txt+1 = E∗txt + λx(xt−j − E∗txt) ; x = pif , (mc+ms); j = 0, 1
11His paper actually focuses on a third category, information provided by the news media, and allows for
imperfect information in the form of noisy signals, issues which go beyond the scope of our paper.
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Internally rational retail firms make rational inter-temporal decisions for their price and output
given adaptive expectations of the aggregate inflation rate and their post-shock real marginal
shock wage rate. As before these variables may be observed with or without a one-period lag
(j = 1, 0), but for aggregate inflation we assume j = 1 as for households, but j = 0 for the
market-specific variable mct. Note that we can in principle distinguish between households’ and
firms’ expectations of inflation.
6 Stability Analysis
We now have three possible models of expectations, rational (i.e. model consistent), boundedly
rational with Euler learning and boundedly but internally rational. We denote these three cases
by RE, EL and IR respectively. In this section we consider homogeneous expectations for which
all agents (households and firms) form either RE or IR or EL expectations. In the next section
we then allow for the possibility that households and firms are heterogenous across these groups
(but retain intra-group homogeneity).
In the numerical results below we fix parameters at their priors used later in the Bayesian
estimation apart from the adaptive learning parameter λx which we set at unity. As stated
above we make the following information assumptions: for observations of aggregate output
and inflation j = 1 which is assumed in the EL approach. Later in the IR approach we need to
model observations of market-specific variables consisting of factor prices, profits and marginal
costs. These we assume can be observed without a lag and therefore j = 0. Note this only
applies to the EL and IR agents but the RE equilibrium for now assumes perfect information
where agents observe all current values of state variables. Later in Section 8 we address this
inconsistency and assume all agents have the same imperfect information (II) set as for IR
agents. However for rational agents the stability conditions considered now can be derived from
a perfect foresight equilibrium and are independent of the information assumption.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the models in (ρr, θpi) space with θy = 0.3 and θdy = 0. Finally
Figure 3 sets ρr = 1 and compares EL and IR models in (αy, αpi) space having re-parameterized
the rule as rn,t = ρrrn,t−1 + αpipit + αyyt. Note that this rule reduces to a price-level rule when
αy = 0. The differences in the sizes of the policy spaces that result in a saddle-path stable
equilibrium are significant. Furthermore a clear ranking of the sizes of these spaces emerges
with RE ⊃ EL ⊃ IR. This means that unless the policy rule is designed for the IR model,
uncertainty as to which model of expectations is correct can lead to a rule that is unstable or
has infinite multiple equilibria (i.e., is indeterminate).
7 Heterogeneous Expectations across Households and Firms
Now we come to the full Brock-Hommes NK model but with IR rather than EL boundedly
rational agents. The composite RE-IR model then has an equilibrium (in the original non-
linear form)
Hdt = nh,t (H
s
t )
RE + (1− nh,t) (Hst )IR
Ct = nh,t (Ct)
RE + (1− nh,t) (Ct)IR = Yt −Gt
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Figure 1: Comparison of Stability Properties of RE and EL Models. ρr > 0, λx = 1.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Stability Properties of EL and IR Models. ρr > 0, λx = 1.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Stability Properties of EL and IR Models. ρr = 1, λx = 1.
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P ot
Pt
= nf,t
(
P ot
Pt
)RE
+ (1− nf,t)
(
P ot
Pt
)IR
Note that rational agents in this model form model-consistent expectations taking into account
the presence of internally rational agents.
We first consider the properties of the model with fixed exogenous proportions of RE and
IR agents. Then we allow these proportions to be determined endogenously. Finally we model
the wealth distribution between RE and IR agents.
7.1 Exogenous Proportions of RE and IR Agents
Figure 4 provides a stability analysis with a price level rule (ρr = 1, αy = 0 in the re-
parameterized rule rn,t = ρrrn,t−1 + αpipit + αyyt), and nh = nf = n in the steady state.
We can see that fast learning (λx = 1) results in a larger regions of instability (a smaller policy
space) than the case of slower learning (λx = 0.25).
So far we have confined the simulations to parameter regions of the model and policy rule that
result in saddle-path stability. If we enter a region of local instability, but global boundedness,
we see chaotic dynamics as highlighted generally in Hommes (2013) and for an NK model with
Euler learning in Branch and McGough (2010). Two points should be made concerning this
possible outcome. First, there is then enormous inflation volatility under chaos so the model
is one of hyper-inflation. Second, we have seen that this clearly undesirable outcome can be
avoided by an appropriate choice of monetary policy rule.
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Figure 4: Stability of RE-IR heterogeneous-agent model with price-level rule under
fast and slow learning.
Figure 5 plots the impulse response functions (IRFs) with standard parameters for the rule
for a shock to monetary policy under fast and slow learning. Figures 10 to 11 in the Online
Appendix show IRFs for shocks to technology and the mark-up shock. Not surprisingly fast
learning sees an IRF converge faster to the RE case, but in either case IR introduces more
persistence compared with RE. This suggests this feature should lead to a better fit of the data
without relying on other persistence mechanisms (shocks, habit or price indexing). This we
examine in the estimation of our model.
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Figure 5: RE versus RE-IR Composite Expectations with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.25, 1.0;
Taylor rule with ρr = 0.7, θpi = 1.5 and θy = 0.3, θdy = 0, Monetary Policy Shock
7.2 Endogenous Proportions of RE and IR Agents
Proportions of rational households and firms are given by
nh,t =
exp(−γΦREh,t )
exp(−γΦh,t)RE + exp(γΦIRh,t)
nf,t =
exp(−γΦREf,t )
exp(−γΦREf,t ) + exp(γΦIRf,t )
where fitness for households given by
ΦREh,t = µ
RE
h Φ
RE
h,t−1 +
(
weighted sum of forecast errors + Ch
)
ΦIRh,t = µ
IR
h Φ
IR
h,t−1 +
(
weighted sum of forecast errors
)
with similar expressions for firms with a subscript f replacing h. Using the estimated model of
the next section, Table 1 provides a third order perturbation solution of non-linear NK RE-IR
Model. In the estimation the model is linearized and the proportions nh,t and nf,t are fixed.
Non-linear estimation is required to pin down the parameters nh, nf in the steady state, and
µRE,IRh , µ
RE,IR
f and γ in the reinforcement learning process. So here we impose them as reported
in the table. We also scale the estimated standard deviations of the shocks using a parameter
σ = 1, 2. The results are that our heterogenous agent model with IR alongside RE agents
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Variable Stochastic Mean Standard Deviation (%) Skewness Kurtosis
Ct
C 0.9993 2.47 0.2792 0.0371
Ht
H 1.0002 0.19 0.0192 0.0327
Wt
W 0.9996 2.15 0.2771 0.0215
Πt
Π 0.9999 0.46 0.0159 0.0645
Rn,t
Rn
0.9999 0.46 0.0070 0.0651
ΦREh,t − Ch -0.000065 0.000020 -0.7589 0.9487
ΦAEh,t -0.000084 0.000054 -1.8238 5.7852
ΦREf,t − Cf -0.000011 0.000009 -0.7203 0.7834
ΦAEf,t -0.000069 0.000053 -2.2156 8.8686
nh,t(γ = 1;σ = 1) 0.093301 0.000004 1.8039 6.0897
nf,t(γ = 1;σ = 1) 0.098603 0.000004 2.2688 9.2725
nh,t(γ = 100;σ = 1) 0.094221 0.003634 1.8039 6.0897
nf,t(γ = 100;σ = 1) 0.101751 0.004303 2.2688 9.2725
nh,t(γ = 1000;σ = 1) 0.102506 0.036343 1.8039 6.0897
nf,t(γ = 1000;σ = 1) 0.130105 0.043030 2.2688 9.2725
nh,t(γ = 1000;σ = 2) 0.129993 0.146939 1.8403 6.6096
nf,t(γ = 1000;σ = 2) 0.224367 0.174046 2.3668 10.5098
Table 1: Third Order Solution of the Estimated NK RE-IR Model; µREh = µ
IR
h =
µREf = µ
IR
f = 0.0; γ = 1, 100, 1000
introduces high kurtosis and skewness12 in macro variables and learning results in the numbers
of rational agents increasing from the estimated deterministic steady state value of 0.093 and
0.099 to 0.13 and 0.22 for households and firms respectively in the stochastic steady state.
7.3 Wealth Distribution
Up to now we have assumed that there is no net lending of borrowing between each of the RE
and IR households. We now relax this assumption and allow for a wealth distribution between
these groups. To achieve a stationary path for bond holdings we need to introduce a portfolio
adjustment cost. Consider the jth RE household with a budget constraint:
BREt (j) = RtB
RE
t−1(j) +WtHt(j)
RE + Γt − Ct(j)RE − Tt − $
2
(BREt−1(j)−B)2
Then zero net wealth in aggregate implies that nh,tB
RE
t = −(1− nh,t)BIRt .
Define the Lagrangian at time t = 0 as
Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt[U(CREt (j), H
RE
t (j))
+ λt(RtB
RE
t−1(j) +WtH
RE
t (j)− Γt − CREt (j)− Tt −
$
2
(BREt−1(j)−B)2)−BREt (j)]
]
12The absence of kurtosis in the standard NK model, often highlighted in the literature (see, for example,
De Grauwe (2012a) is in part simply the consequence of linearization and non-normality is a feature of higher
order approximations.
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Then given BRE0 (j) the first order conditions are
CREt : U
RE
C (j)− λt = 0
BREt : Et
[
βλt+1(Rt+1 −$(BREt (j)−B))− λt
]
= 0
Hence the consumption Euler equation becomes
Et
[
β
UREC,t+1(j)(Rt+1 −$(Bt(j)−B))
UC,t(j)
]
= Et
[
ΛREt,t+1(j)(Rt+1 −$(BREt (j)−B))
]
= 1
The remaining change to the model is to replace CIRt with C
IR
t −BIRt .
With the same choice of parameter values as before and $ chosen to be very small, Figure
6 compares the impulse responses of the RE model with the heterogeneous agent RE-IR model
with exogenous and equal proportions of RE and IR households and firms. Figures 12–13 in the
Online Appendix provide impulse response functions for technology and government spending
shocks. The case where the wealth distribution between RE and IR households is included is
compared with that where (as in all the heterogeneous NK model literature) it is suppressed.
The figures suggest that with our calibration the wealth distribution effect does not significantly
change the equilibrium, at least up to first order for which the impulse responses are computed.
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Figure 6: Wealth Distribution and Impulse Responses – Monetary Policy Shock
8 Bayesian Estimation
We now turn to the estimation of an empirical NK behavioural model which differs from the
linearized form used up to now in two respects: first, we assume that the a steady state about
which the perturbation solution is computed has a non-zero net growth and inflation. The
former is stochastic and given by gt = (1 + g) exp(Atrend) − 1 where Atrend is a shock to
technology trend. The estimation then is conducted to be consistent with the long-term trend
of output and inflation in the data used in the estimation. Second, we generalize the adaptive
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expectations assumption used by IR agents in the previous section drawing upon Hommes et al.
(2015), Anufriev et al. (2015) and Hommes (2011). For any variable with outcome Xt we study
heuristic forecasting rules of the form:
Xet = X
λ1
t−1(X
e
t−1)
1−λ1
(
Xt−1
Xt−2
)λ2
; λ1 ∈ [0, 1], λ2 ∈ [−1, 1]
where Xet ≡ E∗t−1Xt. If we put λ2 = 0, this reduces to the adaptive expectations case of the
previous sections.
We estimate three models with wealth distribution: the NK RE model, the NK model with
individual rationality (IR Model) and the behavioural composite model with heterogeneous
expectations (RE-IR Model). For the RE agents in either the ‘pure’ or composite RE model we
assume and compare perfect or imperfect information sets as discussed in Section 4. Bayesian
methods are employed using Dynare adapted to handle imperfect information.13 We use a
subset of the observable set used in Smets and Wouters (2007) in first difference at quarterly
frequency but extend the sample length to the second quarter of 2008, before the outbreak of
the 2008-09 crisis. Thus the sample period is 1984:1-2008:2. These observable variables are the
log differences of real GDP and the GDP deflator, and the federal funds rate. All series are
seasonally adjusted and taken from the FRED Database available through the Federal Reserve
Bank of St.Louis and the US Bureau of Labour Statistics.
8.1 The Measurement Equations and Priors
The corresponding measurement equations for the 3 observables are:14
 D(logGDPt) ∗ 100log(GDPDEFt/GDPDEFt−1) ∗ 100
FEDFUNDSt/4 ∗ 100
 =

log
(
Yt
Y t
)
− log
(
Yt−1
Y t−1
)
+ trend + y,t − y,t−1 + A,t
log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ conspi + pi,t
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
+ consr

where constants trend, conspi and consr are related to the steady state of our model by
Π = conspi/100 + 1
log(1 + g) = trend/100
Rn =
Π
βg
=
Π(1 + g)
β
= consr/100 + 1
This implies that β is determined empirically as
β =
(
conspi + 100
consr + 100
)
(1 + g)
We introduce measurement errors on two observables, output and inflation (y,t and pi,t) so
in total there are 3 variables in the observations, 4 exogenous AR(1) processes (At, Gt, MSt,
Πtarg,t) and 4 further i.i.d shocks including measurement errors, (MP,t, Atrend,t and y,t, pi,t).
13Levine et al. (2017a) provides full details of this addition to Dynare.
14Yt = GDPt, Y t =trend and trend growth =log Y t−log Y t−1 = log(1+g)+A,t. y,t and pi,t are measurement
equations for output and inflation respectively.
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Thus there are 8 shocks and 3 observables meaning that the invertibilty condition discussed in
Section 4 is not satisfied. A number of the structural parameters are fixed, so as to match their
sample means or in accordance with previous studies and are collected into Θf :
Θf ≡ [ζ, α, µREh , µIRh , µREf , µIRf , γ] = [7.0, 0.7, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0]
These parameters are necessary to solve and linearize the models but are problematic for estima-
tion (e.g. identification). From Section 7 the parameters in the RE-IR model, [µREh µ
IR
h µ
RE
f µ
IR
f γ],
do not enter into the first-order solution for the linearized model but only affect the second-
order or higher solutions. They cannot be identified in the first-order solution that is used for
estimation so are imposed at their mid-point values as above. As in De Grauwe (2011) we fix γ
to unity so that allow for a moderate degree in the intensity of individual choice. The remaining
calibration values for [ζ, α] are standard choices in the DSGE literature.
For the remainder of parameters gamma and inverse gamma distributions are used as priors
when non-negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions or probabil-
ities. Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be necessary. The
prior means and distributions of these parameters can be found in Table 2. The values of priors
are in line with those in Smets and Wouters (2007). The Calvo coefficient ξ is assumed to
be beta distributed with prior mean of 0.5 and prior standard deviation of 0.2, implying that
prices are sticky for two quarters. We draw all the AR(1) parameters ρA, ρMS , ρpi and ρG,
and the lagged interest rate ρr from the beta distribution in order to restrict them to the open
unit interval. Similarly, the beta distribution we use on the adaptive expectations learning
parameter λ1 also restricts it to the open unit interval, but we set a generalized beta prior for
λ2 with support [−1, 1] and 0 mean. For all these beta distribution parameters we centre the
prior density in the middle of the unit interval.
A common theme in papers that study empirical RBC/DSGE models is the difficulty in
pinning down the parameter of labour supply elasticity φ. Inference on the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labour supply has been found susceptible to model specifications, and exhibiting
wide posterior probability intervals. So we assume a normal distribution with mean 2.0 and
standard deviation of 0.5 for the parameter which is well within the range of point estimates
reported in the RBC and labour literature. For the Taylor rule parameter on inflation the
prior is set to obey the Taylor principle is centred at the value suggested by Taylor. With
regard to output level and growth the response of interest rate is smaller but we do not rule out
negative responses for both parameters. Finally the priors on the standard deviations of the
exogenous shocks and measurement errors are assumed to have inverse gamma distributions.
The uncertainty held about these elements motivates an open interval for their priors that
excludes zero and is unbounded.
8.2 Identification Checks and Estimation of the Posterior Distribution
Based on the prior information, we first conduct some pre-estimation identification diagnostics
and report them in detail in Appendix D. We find that the sensitivity effect of nf at its posterior
mean point is relatively weak and also at their estimated values, the pair-wise collinearity
between nf and ξ is very close to an exact linear dependence between the pair (0.9927). From
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Parameter Notation Prior distribution
Density Mean S.D/df
Calvo prices ξ B 0.50 0.10
Labour supply elasticity φ N 2.00 0.50
Adaptive learning ∈ [0, 1] λ1 B 0.50 0.20
Adaptive learning ∈ [−1, 1] λ2 B 0.00 0.30
Interest rate rule
Inflation θpi N 1.50 0.25
Output θy N 0.12 0.05
Output growth θdy N 0.12 0.05
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.75 0.10
AR(1) coefficient
Technology ρA B 0.50 0.20
Government spending ρG B 0.50 0.20
Price mark-up ρMS B 0.50 0.20
Inflation target ρpi B 0.50 0.20
Standard deviation of shocks
Technology trend sd(Atrend) IG 0.10 2.00
Technology sd(A) IG 0.10 2.00
Government spending sd(G) IG 0.10 2.00
Price mark-up sd(MS) IG 0.10 2.00
Inflation target sd(pitarg) IG 0.10 2.00
Monetary policy sd(MP ) IG 0.10 2.00
Standard deviation of measurement errors
Observation error (output) sd(y) IG 0.10 2.00
Observation error (inflation) sd(pi) IG 0.10 2.00
Table 2: Prior Distributions
high correlations to near-exact collinearity one may suspect some weak identification. Figure
15 in the Online Appendix shows the identification strength and sensitivity component in the
moments using the composite RE-IR estimation results and shows again the sensitive strength
in the moments of nh is very weak. Therefore in this section we compare the cases without
estimating nf and nh so the proportions nh = nf = n = 0.5, 0.1 are fixed to the values we used
in the stability section earlier in the paper.
Turning to the estimation, the joint posterior distribution of the estimated parameters is
obtained in two steps. First, the posterior mode and the Hessian matrix are obtained via
standard numerical optimization routines. The Hessian matrix is then used in the Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) algorithm to generate a sample from the posterior distribution. Two parallel
chains are used in the Monte-Carlo Markov Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm.
Thus, 100,000 random draws (though the first 25% ‘burn-in’ observations are discarded to
remove any dependance from the initial conditions) from the posterior density are obtained
via the MCMC-MH algorithm, with the variance-covariance matrix of the perturbation term
in the algorithm being adjusted in order to obtain reasonable acceptance rates (between 20%-
40%). We run an iterative process of MCMC simulations in order to calibrate the scaling
factor to achieve the desired rate of acceptance which is key for the speed of convergence of the
MCMC-MH chains, which are also sensitive to the number of MCMC iterations. The former
ensures that more of the parameter region is searched more regularly, but at the expense of
reducing the acceptance ratio. In this estimation the number of draws we choose is sufficient to
allow for convergence. To formally test and to check the convergence, besides calibrating the
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acceptance rate, we use the convergence indicators recommended by Brooks and Gelman (1998)
and Gelman et al. (2003).
8.3 Bayes Factor Comparison
We first focus on the pure RE, pure IR and the composite RE-IR models when RE agents have a
perfect information set. We employ the Bayes Factor (BF) from the model marginal likelihoods
to gauge the relative merits across the four models in Table 3.
Model Pure RE (PI) Pure IR RE(PI)-IR (n=0.5) RE(PI)-IR (n=0.1)
LL -143.05 -138.90 -139.38 -138.15
Prob 0.0042 0.2666 0.1649 0.5643
Table 3: Marginal Log-likelihood Values and Posterior Model Odds: RE Agents
with Perfect Information (PI)
Models IR (Pure IR) and RE-IR (n = 0.1, 0.5) all substantially outperform their RE coun-
terpart which is firmly rejected by the data. Formally, using the Bayesian statistical language
of Kass and Raftery (1995), a BF, the quotient of the probabilities reported, greater than 100
(marginal log-likelihood difference over 4.61) offers “decisive evidence”. Thus we have decisive
support for the pure IR and some composite behaviour from the US data we observe. However
the BF differences between the non-RE models are not strong.
Next we assume an imperfect information set for the RE agents of the form:
It = [Ys−1,Πs−1, Rn,s ; s ≤ t]
The policy maker is assumed observe current output, inflation and to know to know her own
current inflation target. The implemented rule therefore is still (30), but the perceived rule for
RE agents with II, again imposing point expectations, is now given by the rule:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θpi log
(
EtΠt
EtΠtarg,t
)
+ θy log
(
EtYt
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
EtYt
Yt−1
))
+ MP,t (56)
where rational expectations under II of current inflation, output and the inflation target are
now required to implement the rule. An important point to stress is that this is the same
information set we assume for IR agents when they come to update their heuristic rule. In
this sense we now have informational consistency across IR and RE agents, and also with the
econometrician estimating the model. This feature we believe is new for the heterogeneous
behavioural NK model literature.15 The results for the likelihood race are reported in Table 4.
15If we assume informational consistency for the policymaker as well then her information set would be It =
[Ys−1,Πs−1, Rn,s,Πtarg,t]. Then the implemented rule becomes (56), rather than (30), but with EtΠtarg,t replaced
with Πtarg,t (since the policymaker knows her own target). But then the set-up involves two imperfect information
sets and goes beyond our II framework with only one. This more general case is studied in Lubik et al. (2017) who
show that this generalization results in different Blanchard-Kahn stability conditions for perfect and imperfect
information.
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Model Pure RE (II) Pure IR RE(II)-IR (n=0.5) RE(II)-IR (n=0.1)
LL -135.60 -138.90 -136.83 -137.88
Prob 0.6986 0.0258 0.2042 0.0715
Table 4: Marginal Log-likelihood Values and Posterior Model Odds: RE Agents
with Imperfect Information (II)
Now a very different picture emerges when comparing the RE model with the behavioural
alternatives. RE with imperfect information (RE(II)) actually wins the likelihood race. In
formal Bayesian language, a BF of 10-100 or a marginal likelihood range of [2.30, 4.61] is
“strong to very strong evidence” so the RE(II) strongly dominates the pure II and RE(II)-IR
with n=0.1. But the likelihood race cannot separate the RE(II) and RE(II)-IR composite model
with n=0.5. In Section 9 we examine whether the ability to match second moments of the data
is able to separate these two models. But first we turn to the parameter estimation results.
8.4 Parameter Estimation Results
Table 5 contains summary statistics of the posterior distributions of the NK models. We re-
port posterior means of the parameters of interest and 95% probability intervals alongside the
posterior model odds for all 7 models so far: RE(PI), RE(II), IR and RE(PI)-IR or RE(II)-IR
with n = 0.5, 0.1.
The price stickiness parameter, ξ, is estimated to be larger than assumed in the prior
distribution (0.59). This implies that there is some degree of price stickiness and the implied
average contract duration is about 2.44 quarters from this model. The posteriors of this model
also indicate a Frisch labour supply elasticity, φ−1 = 0.61 and a strong response to inflation
that satisfies the Taylor principle, θpi = 1.77. In terms of the persistence of the exogenous
shocks, the estimates of the AR(1) coefficients show that the technology and inflation shocks
are inertial. According to the estimated standard deviation, the technology shock stands out as
being the most volatile structural shock in this economy. The interest rate policy shock is less
volatile and is less important in driving inflation, consumption and output. The variations in
measurement error of output is relatively moderate in this model but there is a sizeable estimate
of the inflation measurement error. Overall these estimates are in the range often found in the
existing literature.
The IR solution equilibrium we propose departs from the standard RE solutions and allows a
process of adaptive learning driven by the speed of learning parameter λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and λ2 ∈ [−1, 1]
for the household and firms respectively. The closer λ is to zero slower the learning process
is, which is the key mechanism of this setup because this introduces more dynamics into the
model.
Focusing on the parameter characterising the degree of price stickiness, ξ, again, the mean
estimates report an average price contract duration of around 1.96 and 1.92 quarters for IR
and RE-IR. Their estimated 95% intervals imply that price contacts change in the ranges of
∈ (1.54, 2.50) suggesting that the firms of IR and RE-IR economies change prices as frequently
as once every 1.5 quarters. The estimated contract length is shorter in the non-pure-RE models.
The estimates of the AR(1) coefficients show that the technology shock is significantly inertial.
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With IR in the model, the exogenous technology shock volatility contributes the most to the
variation in the data and the monetary/fiscal policy volatility mattes much less for this aspect
of the fit. The price mark-up shock (the uncertainty interval) is sightly larger than that of the
RE model because the expectation heterogeneity in the model increases inflation volatility (un-
certainty) and acts as a persistent force in this behavioural economy in the inflation fluctuations
(this is also evident in the following section when we examine the implied model moments). The
measurement error on inflation also has some sizeable contribution.
For the policy rule, we find that for the behavioural models the parameter estimate for
the degree of interest rate smoothing indicates that there is a low degree of persistence in the
nominal interest rate which is much lower than observed in the literature. The responses to
output (θy, θdy) are very low, nearly non-existent, while the feedback to inflation (θpi) is strong,
implying a stronger concern from the monetary authorities about inflation variability, relative
to the moments in output, which is caused by the varying forecast behaviours from agents’
heterogenous expectations.
Overall, the parameter estimates are reasonably robust across information specifications, de-
spite the fact that the II alternative leads to a much better model fit based on the corresponding
posterior marginal likelihood. It is interesting to note that the point estimates of almost every
single parameter under II are tighter and more strongly determined compared with the case
under the standard PI assumption, i.e., the confidence intervals are more tightly estimated with
II, so this helps to explain its superior performance in the likelihood race.
9 Matching Second Moments
In this section we examine the model second moments, which has been a standard practice for
researchers in the RBC tradition. We consider second moments and autocorrelations in turn.
In this section, we mainly focus our analysis on the baseline RE model with its II variant,
the behavioural IR and the outperforming composite, including conditional second moments
implied by the estimated models such as impulse responses.
In terms of matching volatility the behavioural composite RE(II)-IR is able to match pre-
cisely the rate of change of output (henceforth referred to as ‘output’) standard deviation in the
data and performs very well at getting much closer to the interest rate data, whereas the pure
RE model (including II) performs very poorly at capturing inflation and interest rate volatility,
lying well-outside the 95% confidence bands. In the pure RE(PI) economy, the central bank
can reduce output variability by applying a policy regime with strong output responses, but
this comes at a cost of much higher inflation volatility. However, for the behavioural composite,
there is room for improvement in matching inflation volatility. The model’s ability of matching
inflation moments is distorted, generating much volatility in inflation than the data and as noted
this can be explained by the role played by the more volatile pricing shock (MS) found in the
estimated models which gives rise to the amplification effects on inflation dynamics caused by
the expectation heterogeneity in the behavioural economy. The pure IR model is able to reduce
this volatility while still matching output well.
Table 6 also reports the cross-correlations of the 3 observable variables vis-a-vis output.
All the estimated models do well and predict the correct sign for the output-inflation cross-
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Pure RE(PI) RE-IR(n=0.5) RE-IR(n=0.1) Pure IR Pure RE(II) RE-IR(n=0.5,II)RE-IR(n=0.1,II)
ξ 0.59 [0.50:0.68] 0.49 [0.35:0.62] 0.48 [0.35:0.61] 0.49 [0.35:0.64] 0.60 [0.54:0.67] 0.43 [0.30:0.58] 0.42 [0.27:0.56]
φ 1.64 [0.71:2.66] 1.73 [0.87:2.58] 1.74 [0.88:2.65] 1.63 [0.72:2.57] 1.44 [0.64:2.22] 2.00 [1.75:2.32] 1.81 [1.59:2.05]
Adaptive learning
λ1 - 0.17 [0.04:0.38] 0.29 [0.04:0.65] 0.29 [0.04:0.66] - 0.66 [0.53:0.86] 0.51 [0.30:0.73]
λ2 - 0.58 [0.37:0.82] 0.47 [0.16:0.82] 0.40 [0.04:0.85] - 0.14 [-0.03:0.34] 0.20 [0.01:0.51]
Proportion of rationality (imposed)
nh 1.00 0.50 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.10
nf 1.00 0.50 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.10
Interest rate rule
θpi 1.77 [1.46:2.11] 1.28 [1.12:1.43] 1.22 [1.05:1.46] 1.17 [1.06:1.26] 1.55 [1.22:1.85] 1.10 [1.04:1.17] 1.09 [1.04:1.13]
θy 0.09 [0.01:0.17]-0.03 [-0.06:0.00]-0.02 [-0.05:0.00]-0.01 [-0.04:0.01]0.14 [0.06:0.22] 0.01 [-0.00:0.03] 0.00 [-0.01:0.01]
θdy 0.11 [0.03:0.20] 0.02 [-0.03:0.07] 0.02 [-0.03:0.07] 0.00 [-0.01:0.01] 0.10 [0.01:0.18] 0.11 [0.05:0.18] -0.00 [-0.04:0.03]
ρr 0.55 [0.40:0.68] 0.40 [0.33:0.47] 0.39 [0.33:0.45] 0.41 [0.36:0.46] 0.49 [0.37:0.61] 0.36 [0.30:0.44] 0.38 [0.32:0.44]
AR(1) coefficients
ρA 0.86 [0.78:0.94] 0.96 [0.93:0.99] 0.96 [0.92:0.99] 0.96 [0.92:0.99] 0.36 [0.08:0.65] 0.96 [0.94:0.99] 0.96 [0.93:0.99]
ρG 0.49 [0.23:0.71] 0.51 [0.19:0.84] 0.54 [0.24:0.86] 0.51 [0.14:0.80] 0.41 [0.25:0.58] 0.51 [0.21:0.88] 0.51 [0.29:0.68]
ρMS 0.50 [0.16:0.84] 0.50 [0.18:0.79] 0.50 [0.18:0.81] 0.53 [0.21:0.84] 0.47 [0.18:0.80] 0.58 [0.41:0.76] 0.56 [0.24:0.83]
ρpi 0.97 [0.94:0.99] 0.73 [0.40:0.96] 0.57 [0.25:0.95] 0.54 [0.21:0.89] 0.98 [0.96:0.99] 0.66 [0.49:0.86] 0.48 [0.34:0.69]
Standard deviation of shocks
Atrend0.55 [0.48:0.62] 0.09 [0.06:0.11] 0.09 [0.06:0.12] 0.09 [0.07:0.12] 0.59 [0.53:0.66] 0.08 [0.05:0.11] 0.09 [0.06:0.12]
A 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.56 [0.49:0.62] 0.55 [0.47:0.62] 0.54 [0.48:0.61] 0.07 [0.03:0.12] 0.60 [0.54:0.66] 0.60 [0.53:0.65]
G 0.14 [0.02:0.30] 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.06 [0.02:0.09] 0.14 [0.02:0.29] 0.08 [0.02:0.19] 0.07 [0.02:0.11] 0.10 [0.02:0.24]
MS 0.07 [0.03:0.11] 0.07 [0.02:0.12] 0.10 [0.03:0.22] 0.10 [0.02:0.22] 0.08 [0.03:0.14] 0.10 [0.02:0.23] 0.10 [0.02:0.24]
pi 0.08 [0.05:0.10] 0.05 [0.03:0.06] 0.04 [0.03:0.06] 0.04 [0.02:0.06] 0.07 [0.04:0.09] 0.04 [0.02:0.06] 0.04 [0.02:0.06]
MP 0.07 [0.02:0.12] 0.04 [0.02:0.05] 0.04 [0.03:0.06] 0.04 [0.02:0.05] 0.06 [0.02:0.09] 0.04 [0.02:0.05] 0.04 [0.02:0.05]
Standard deviation of measurement errors
y 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.06 [0.03:0.11] 0.07 [0.03:0.13] 0.07 [0.02:0.12] 0.06 [0.03:0.09] 0.06 [0.03:0.09] 0.06 [0.02:0.10]
pi 0.52 [0.45:0.65] 0.47 [0.40:0.54] 0.48 [0.42:0.55] 0.48 [0.42:0.57] 0.60 [0.53:0.67] 0.53 [0.47:0.59] 0.53 [0.47:0.61]
Price contract length
1
1−ξ 2.44 1.96 1.92 1.96 2.50 1.75 1.72
Marginal likelihood and posterior model odd
LL -143.05 -139.38 -138.15 -138.90 -135.60 -136.83 -137.88
Prob. 0.0004 0.0149 0.0509 0.0241 0.6523 0.1907 0.0667
Table 5: Bayesian Posterior Distributions for RE, IR and Composite RE-IR Models:
Perfect Information (PI) and Imperfect Information (II) Assumptions for RE Agents. For all
estimated models we use observations with a lag and the information set for lag 1 case at time
t is It = {Yt−1,Πt−1, Rn,t}. n = nh = nf = 0.5, 0.1 are imposed in this estimation. The trend
or mean of the data variables are calculated directly from the data and not estimated with the
rest of the model. The steady state is consistent with these values.
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correlation and the best performing behavioural composite is also highly successful in repro-
ducing the co-movement in the data. However, in terms of the output-interest rate correlation,
all models perform poorly and have the wrong sign although the RE-II assumption improves
in this dimension, getting slightly closer to the data. Overall, the strength of the composite-II
behaviour reproducing business cycles lies in the output and interest rate moments as the esti-
mated model matches most of the US data and the empirical moments are captured well-within
the 95% uncertainty bands in the data.
Standard Deviation
Output Inflation Interest rate
US Data 0.58 0.24 0.61
(0.50, 0.69) (0.21, 0.27) (0.55, 0.70)
Pure RE(PI) 0.54 1.02 0.84
Pure IR 0.53 0.68 0.45
Pure RE(II) 0.60 1.17 0.97
Heuristic-RE(II)-IR (n = 0.5) 0.58 0.78 0.58
Cross-correlation with Output
US Data 1.00 -0.12 0.22
(-) (-0.31, 0.10) (0.02, 0.39)
Pure RE(PI) 1.00 -0.02 -0.02
Pure IR 1.00 -0.04 -0.05
Pure RE(II) 1.00 -0.01 -0.01
Heuristic-RE(II)-IR (n = 0.5) 1.00 -0.07 -0.08
Table 6: Selected Second Moments (At the Posterior Means): For the empirical mo-
ments computed from the dataset the bootstrapped 95% confidence bounds based on the sample
estimates are presented in parentheses.
If we look at the autocorrelations up to 10 lags in Figure 7, the picture is also somewhat
mixed. Overall it shows very good goodness-of-fit of RE-IR Composite under II to data in terms
of successfully capturing the autocorrelations up to many lags – in any case, almost all of the
moments are inside the 95% confidence intervals of the empirical moments of autocorrelations,
which leads to some confidence in the estimated models. Model RE with and without II is
problematic in reproducing the output autocorrelations at the first two and three orders, ACF
lying outside of the lower interval and having the wrong sign. The behavioural composite with
the generalized forecasting rule is capable of generating more persistence in inflation and interest
rate than the IR special case and the reason for this lies in the estimated learning mechanism
of the adaptive expectations scheme in, for example, forecasting inflation movements from their
RE counterparts. These autocorrelations are able to reproduce an important stylized fact,
namely the persistence of aggregate inflation usually observed in empirical data, generating
much inertia in the time path to match the actual inflation (also shown in the IRF predictions
below). This is more effective than the pure RE case with II learning and/or exogenous shock
dynamics which generates too much inertia. Finally switching the information set from PI to
II for the RE model produces a little more persistence, captured by the implied correlograms
of inflation.
The findings in this section are generally in line with those in Jang and Sacht (2014), who
conduct an empirical investigation on moment matching using a bounded rationality behavioural
model a` la De Grauwe (2011) estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments for the Euro
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Area. They find that their results can mimic the real data well, slightly outperforming the linear
RE counterpart in some of the moments, or are at least as good as the RE model in terms of
providing fits for auto- and cross-covariances of the data. Perhaps the main message to emerge
from this RBC type of model validity exercise is that it can be misleading to assess model fit
using a selective choice of second moment comparisons as there are trade-offs in terms of fitting
some second moments well, at the expense of others. As pointed out the most comprehensive
form of assessment of competing models is via likelihood comparisons. In this moments analysis
there is some evidence that shows a good fit of both RE(II) and Composite RE-IR, in particular
how they capture the autocorrelation dynamics and output volatility, to some dimensions of the
data but this needs to be analysed with some caution and the probabilistic assessment using the
marginal likelihoods provides the most decisive support. Our estimated models so far replicate
the stylized facts, yielding persistence in aggregate data, obtaining reasonable inertia to get
close to the data with the endogenized learning mechanisms – this shows an improved ability of
the DSGE model with II and IR behaviour to generate endogenous propagation mechanisms.
This explains the improved overall model fit in the comparison section.
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Figure 7: Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the Estimated
Models: The approximate 95% confidence bands are constructed using the large-lag standard
errors (see Anderson (1976)).
10 Posterior Impulse Responses and Endogenous Persistence
As shown above from the estimated models and the moment analysis, both the heuristic rules
and RE-II learning mechanisms introduces more dynamics (persistence) into the model solu-
tions. As a result, the empirical models incorporating either form of endogenous learning can
significantly outperform the standard RE-PI model in the likelihood comparison. The empirical
impulse response functions from the estimated models in this section support these conclusions.
In Figures 8 - 9, relaxing PI in particular introduces more persistence compared with RE-PI,
generating more hump-shaped trajectories after the system is shocked suggesting this feature
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Figure 8: Estimated Impulse Responses – Technology Shock
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Figure 9: Estimated Impulse Responses – Monetary Policy Shock
should lead to a better fit of the data without relying on other model internal inertia mecha-
nisms.
The IRFs also attempt to address the difficulty of generating reasonable endogenous per-
sistence in DSGE frameworks and replicating the observed business cycle stylized facts. As
already seen in Table 5, our baseline RE model with II learning statistically dominates all other
modelling assumptions. Relaxing 50% pure rationality in the baseline model with the general
heuristic learning rule also performs well. Model fit can be much improved without resorting to
building a large number of frictions and shocks, offering a parsimonious approach while relaxing
the extreme RE and PI. Of particular interest for the evaluation of using internal propagation
mechanisms, relaxing full rationality leads to a reduction in the estimated degree of price stick-
iness ξ. In addition, relaxing the RE and perfect information restrictions generally leads to a
reduction in the estimated persistence of the shock processes (e.g. ρA or ρpi in particular).
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We also find that the lagged interest rate is highly significant in the estimated policy rule, but
the estimated inertia is much reduced when IR and II are introduced, suggesting a reduction
in the persistence needed in the rule. The monetary policy volatility matters much less for
explaining the data variation aspect of the fit when the model is no longer pure RE. Overall
taking the results reported in Sections 8, 9 and 10, we can capture business cycle movements
without having to assume either highly autocorrelated shocks, high policy rule persistence
and/or the presence of endogenous inertia in the model due to, for example, habit formation in
consumption and lengthy price-setting contracts. This contrasts with standard DSGE models
in a RE-PI environment.
11 Conclusions
This paper studies an NK behavioural model for which boundedly rational beliefs of inter-
nally rational (IR) economic agents are about payoff-relevant macroeconomic variables that are
exogenous to their decision rules. IR agents do not know they are identical, as opposed to
Euler-learning (EL) where agents are (implicitly) assumed to know the symmetric nature of the
equilibrium. We compare pure forms of RE, IR and EL models before proceeding to construct
a Brock-Hommes composite model with reinforcement learning.
We examine the policy space of feedback parameters in a Taylor-type rule with interest rate
persistence. We find that the pure IR model has a smaller policy space than pure EL which
in turn is smaller than pure RE, making it more prone to local instability and the possibility
of chaos. The differences in the sizes of the policy spaces that result in a saddle-path stable
equilibrium are significant. Furthermore a clear ranking of the sizes of these spaces emerges
with RE ⊃ EL ⊃ IR. This means that unless the policy rule is designed for the IR model,
uncertainty as to which model of expectations is correct can lead to a rule that is unstable or
indeterminate.
In a Bayesian estimation of the RE-IR composite model with exogenous proportions of
RE and IR agents, informational assumptions are central to the paper. In comparisons of
different composites including the pure RE and IR cases, we impose what we term informational
consistency where RE and IR agents in the model share the same imperfect information as the
econometrician estimating the model. We contrast this with the standard assumption that RE
agents have perfect information of the current state variables. We find in a likelihood race
that the RE model with imperfect information (II) outperforms the IR model which in turn
outperforms RE with perfect information (PI). When we examine the behavioural composite
model with a general heuristic forecasting rule and the RE agents having only II, the behavioural
model cannot be statistically distinguished from RE with II. Second moment comparisons with
the data are mixed, but the RE-IR composite with II captures more dimensions than RE with II
with the latter projecting more drawn-out impulse response trajectories. These results suggest
that persistence can be injected into the NK model to improve data fit in two contrasting
ways: bounded-rationality with learning, and retaining RE, but with imperfect information
Kalman-filtering learning.
Our results for a very simple NK model suggest a new agenda for constructing empirical
medium-sized NK models. Future work will embed the RE-IR composite model into a richer
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NK model along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007), use non-linear estimation methods to
identify a number of parameters involving reinforcement learning that are not identified using
linear Bayesian estimation and examine optimal monetary policy. Future work on the policy
aspect will follow Hall and Mitchell (2007), Geweke and Amisano (2012) and Deak et al. (2017)
and estimate an optimal pool of RE and RE-IR composites to design a robust rule across such
model variants.
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ONLINE APPENDICES (Not for Publication)
A Summary of Composite RE-IR Model
In stationarized form the model for exogenous proportions nh,t and nf,t we have:
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Wealth Distribution:
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t + Γt − CIRt − Tt −
$
2
(BIRt−1 −B)2
having introduced a portfolio cost adjustment with a small $. Then replace CIRt and Euler
equation above with
CIRt −BIRt
(1− E∗tβg,t+1)
=
1
(CIRt )
1
φ
W 1+ 1φt +
((
E∗tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)
E∗tWt+1
)1+ 1
φ
(E∗tβg,t+1)
1
φ (E∗tRext+1)
1+ 1
φ − 1
+ Γt −Gt
+
(
E∗tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)
E∗t (Γt+1 −Gt+1)
E∗tRext+1 − 1
≡ 1
(CIRt )
1
φ
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t +
(
E∗tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)1+ 1
φ
Ω1,t
)
+ Γt −Gt +
(
E∗tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)
Ω2,t
UREC,t = Et
[
βg,t+1U
RE
C,t+1(Rt+1 −$(BREt −B))
]
where zero net wealth implies nh,tB
RE
t = −(1− nh,t)BIRt .
Closure of Model:
Yt = nh,tC
RE
t + (1− nh,t)CIRt +Gt
Gt = Tt
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θpi log
(
Πt
Πtarg,t
)
+ θy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
Yt
Yt−1
))
+ MP,t (Perfect Information)
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θpi log
(
Et[Πt]
Πtarg,t
)
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+ θy log
(
Et[Yt]
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
Et[Yt]
Yt−1
))
+ MP,t (Imperfect Information)
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + A,t
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + G,t
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + MS,t
log Πtarg,t − log Π = ρpi(log Πtarg,t−1 − log Π) + pi,t
Endogenous Proportions of RE and IR Agents:
The payoff for households and firms is expressed on terms of a discounted sum of past weighted
forecast errors, Φh,t say, starting at t = 0 for with rational and non-rational households respec-
tively:
ΦREh,t = µ
RE
h Φ
RE
h,t−1 − (1− µREh )
(
wβg(βg,t − Eh,t−1βg,t)/βg)2 + wG((Gt − Eh,t−1Gt)/G)2
+ wW ((Wt − Eh,t−1Wt)/W )2 + wh,Π((Πt − Eh,t−1Π)/Π)2
+ wΓ((Γt − Eh,t−1Γt)/Γ)2 + wR((Rn,t − Et−1Rn,t)/Rn)2 + Ch
)
ΦIRh,t = µ
IR
h Φ
IR
h,t−1 − (1− µIRh )
(
wβg(βg,t − E∗h,t−1βg,t)/βg)2 + wG((Gt − E∗h,t−1Gt)/G)2
+ wW ((Wt − E∗h,t−1Wt)/W )2 + wh,Π((Πt − E∗h,t−1Π)/Π)2 + wΓ((Γt − E∗h,t−1Γt)/Γ)2
+ wR((Rn,t − Et−1Rn,t)/Rn)2)
)
The parameter Ch is a fixed cost of being rational for households. For firms this becomes
ΦREf,t = µ
RE
f Φ
RE
f,t−1 − (1− µREf )
(
wY ((Yt − Ef,t−1Yt)/Y )2 + wf,Π((Πt − Ef,t−1Π)/Π)2
+ wMC((M˜Ct − Ef,t−1M˜Ct)/MC)2 + Cf
)
ΦIRf,t = µ
IR
f Φ
IR
f,t−1 − (1− µIRf )
(
wY ((Yt − E∗f,t−1Yt)/Y )2 + wf,Π((Πt − E∗f,t−1Π)/Π)2
+ wMC((M˜Ct − E∗f,t−1M˜Ct)/MC)2
)
where the parameter Cf is a fixed cost of being rational for firms and we allow for the possibility
that Ch 6= Cf .
Note that for variable Xt, Et−1Xt above denotes rational expectations so that putting
(EX)t−1 ≡ Et−1Xt we have the Dynare set-up
(EX)t = EtXt+1 coded as EiX = X(+1) for i = h, f where appropriate
Then the proportions of rational households and firms is given by
nh,t =
exp(γΦREh,t )
exp(γΦh,t)RE + exp(γΦ
IR
h,t)
=
exp(γ(ΦREh,t − ΦIRh,t))
exp(γ(ΦREh,t − ΦIRh,t)) + 1
nf,t =
exp(γΦREf,t )
exp(γΦf,t)RE + exp(γΦ
IR
f,t )
=
exp(γ(ΦREf,t − ΦIRf,t ))
exp(γ(ΦREf,t − ΦIRf,t )) + 1
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Thus the proportion of rational agents in the steady state is given by
nh =
exp(−γCh)
exp(−γCh) + 1
nf =
exp(−γCf )
exp(−γCf ) + 1
which is pinned down by the cost parameters (Ch, Cf ) (which can be positive or negative).
Welfare and Consumption Equivalence:
Ut = log((nh,tC
RE
t + (1− nh,t)CIRt )−
(nh,tH
RE
t + (1− nh,tHt)IR)1+φ
1 + φ
welt = (1− βg,t)Ut + Et[βg,t+1welt+1]
welREt = (1− βg,t)UREt + Et[βg,t+1welREt+1]
welIRt = (1− βg,t)U IRt + Et[βg,t+1welIRt+1]
CEt = log(1.01Ct)− log(Ct)
B Balanced Growth Steady State
In recursive form the zero-growth zero-inflation (Π = 1) steady state of can be written
R =
1
β
Λ = β
MC =
PW
P
= 1− 1
ζ
C
Y
= 1− gy
H =
α∆αMC
κ(1− gy)
Y W = (AH)α
Y =
Y W
∆α
W = α
PW
P
Y W
H
J =
YMCUC
(1− 1ζ )(1− ξβΠζ)
JJ =
Y UC
(1− ξβΠζ−1)
Hence with Π = 1, J = JJ
∆ = 1
Γ = Y − αMCY W
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For a particular steady state inflation rate Π > 1 the NK features of the steady state become
J
JJ
=
(
1− ξΠζ−1
1− ξ
) 1
1−ζ
MC =
PW
P
=
(
1− 1
ζ
)
J(1− βξΠζ)
JJ(1− βξΠζ−1)
∆ =
(1− ξ)α ( JJJ )−ζ
1− ξΠζ
Then PWY W /PY = MC∆.
We can now easily set up the model with a balanced-exogenous-growth steady state. Now
the process for At is replaced with
At = A¯tA
c
t
A¯t = (1 + g)A¯t−1 exp(A,t)
logAct − logAc = ρA(logAct−1 − logAc) + A,t
where At is a labour-augmenting technical progress parameter which we decompose into a
cyclical component, Act , modelled as a temporary AR(1) process and a stochastic trend, whose
log is a random walk with drift, A¯t. Thus the balanced growth deterministic steady state path
(bgp) is driven by labour-augmenting technical change growing at a net rate g. If we put
g = trend,t = 0 and A¯t = 1, we arrive at our previous formulation with A
c
t = At.
Now stationarize variables by defining cyclical and stationary components:
(Y Wt )
c ≡ Y
W
t
A¯t
= ActH
α
t
Cct ≡
Ct
A¯t
W ct ≡
Wt
A¯t
U ct ≡ logCct − κ
H1+φt
1 + φ
U cC,t ≡
1
Cct
Λt,t+1 = β
UC,t+1
UC,t
= βg,t+1
U cC,t+1
U cC,t
for all non-stationary variables where
gt ≡ (A¯t − A¯t−1)
A¯t
= (1 + g) exp(A,t)− 1
βg,t ≡ β(1 + gt)
is the stochastic steady state growth rate and the stationarized Euler equation and the Calvo
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pricing become
Et [Λt,t+1Rt+1] = Et
[
βg,t+1
U cC,t+1
U cC,t
Rt+1
]
= 1
and
ĴJ
c
t − ξEt[Πζ−1t+1 ĴJ
c
t+1Λt,t+1] = Y
c
t
Ĵct − ξEt[Πζt+1Ĵct+1Λt,t+1] = Y ct MCtMSt
or equivalently
ĴJ
c
t − ξEt[Πζ−1t+1 ĴJ
c
t+1βg,t+1] = Y
c
t U
c
t
Ĵct − ξEt[Πζt+1Ĵct+1βg,t+1] = Y ct U ctMCtMSt
The steady state for the rest of the system is the same as the zero-growth one except for
the following relationships:
R =
1
βg
=
Rn
Π
where R and Rn are the real and nominal steady state interest rates and Π is inflation.
C Proof of Lemma
In the first order conditions for Calvo contracts and expressions for value functions we are
confronted with expected discounted sums of the general form
Ωt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
βkXt,t+kYt+k
]
where Xt,t+k has the property Xt,t+k = Xt,t+1Xt+1,t+k and Xt,t = 1 (for example an inflation,
interest or discount rate over the interval [t, t+ k]).
Lemma
Ωt can be expressed as
Ωt = Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1]
Proof
Ωt = Xt,tYt + Et
[ ∞∑
k=1
βkXt,t+kYt+k
]
= Yt + Et
[ ∞∑
k′=0
βk
′+1Xt,t+k′+1Yt+k′+1
]
= Yt + βEt
[ ∞∑
k′=0
βk
′
Xt,t+1Xt+1,t+k′+1Yt+k′+1
]
= Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1] 
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C.1 Proof of Equation 29
In the next period, ξ of these firms will keep their old prices, and (1 − ξ) will change their
prices to POt+1. By the law of large numbers, we assume that the distribution of prices among
those firms that do not change their prices is the same as the overall distribution in period t.
It follows that we may write
∆t+1 = ξ
∑
jno change
(
Pt(j)
Pt+1
)−ζ
+ (1− ξ)
(
Jt+1
JJt+1
)−ζ
= ξ
(
Pt
Pt+1
)−ζ ∑
jno change
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ζ
+ (1− ξ)
(
Jt+1
JJt+1
)−ζ
= ξ
(
Pt
Pt+1
)−ζ∑
j
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ζ
+ (1− ξ)
(
Jt+1
JJt+1
)−ζ
= ξΠζt+1∆t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt+1
JJt+1
)−ζ

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D Addition to Section 7
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Figure 10: RE versus RE-IR Composite Expectations with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.25, 1.0;
Taylor rule with ρr = 0.7, θpi = 1.5 and θy = 0.3. Technology Shock
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Figure 11: RE versus RE-IR Composite Expectations with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.25, 1.0;
Taylor rule with ρr = 0.7, θpi = 1.5 and θy = 0.3. Mark-up Shock
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Figure 12: Wealth Distribution and Impulse Responses – Technology Shock
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Figure 13: Wealth Distribution and Impulse Responses – Government Spending
Shock
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E Identification Strength at Priors and Posteriors
It is necessary to confront the question of parameter identifiability in our DSGE models before
taking them to the data, as model or parameter identification is a prerequisite for the infor-
mativeness of different estimators, and their effectiveness when one uses the models to address
policy questions. In this section we focus on detecting parameter identification difficulties that
are inherent in the structure of the models. As mentioned we fix some parameters before es-
timation because of their non-identification in the model solution (at first order). The aim of
this section is to scan the parameters we choose to estimate in terms of their identification in
our models. Among the authors who have made the most recent contributions to addressing
the identification issues in DSGE models are Iskrev (2008) and Iskrev (2010b), Canova and
Sala (2009), and Komunjer and Ng (2011). We use Iskrev (2010b)’s computational toolbox to
perform formal identification checks on the reduced form parameters and structural parameters.
This approach is based on evaluating analytically the information matrix of the reduced-form
model and checking for rank deficiency of gradient matrix (the Jacobian). Our checks are per-
formed in terms of a local analysis that is based on the identification evaluation at the point
values of the prior means in Table 2 and a ‘global’ prior exploration of point identification
properties by taking a Monte Carlo samples from the prior space. The identifiability of each
draw including the mean prior is established by studying the ranks of Jacobian of the model
and given the set of observable variables and the sample size (the sample moments).
We take our models to the identification toolbox that computes the Jacobian numerically
of the model (the solution) and the moments for rank evaluations prior to estimating them.
To completely rule out a flat likelihood at the local point we also check collinearity between
the effects of different parameters on the likelihood. If there exists an exact linear dependence
between a pair and among all possible combinations their effects on the moments are not distinct
which must indicate a flat likelihood and lack of identification. We find that the Jacobian matrix
has full rank and that the models can be identified locally within the prior space. This includes
our key parameters for behaviourial heterogeneity λ1, nh and nf .
A further output of Iskrev (2010b)’s identification routine is the analysis of identification
strength, i.e., focusing on weak identification, summarized in Figures 13 - 16 in Appendix B.
The procedures are based on either the asymptotic or a moment information matrix. The
first can be obtained given a sample of size T , whereas the second can be computed based on
Monte Carlo simulations for samples of size T , from which sample moments of the observed
variables are computed, forming a sample of N replicas of simulated moments. The corre-
sponding information matrix is then obtained as IT (θ|mT) = HTΣmTHT , where ΣmT is the
covariance matrix of simulated moments and HT the derivatives of the vector collecting all the
reduced-form coefficients. We now examine more carefully all our parameters at the means of
the prior and posterior distributions and using the prior uncertainty. We focus this analysis
on the two behaviourial models and report the sensitivity measure and collinearity results for
all parameters evaluated at the prior mean, relative to the prior standard deviation and at the
posterior mean obtained using the estimated models in the next section. Note that, in Ap-
pendix B, all their parameters are sensitive in affecting the likelihood through their effects on
the moments of the observed variables. Table 7 highlights the effects of λ1, nh and nf on the
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likelihood which are very strong (at least at the prior means). Although some similarities in
terms of pair-wise collinearity are detected it is important to confirm that no linear dependance
(non-identification) is found across the estimated parameters in these models.
Sensitivity Collinearity
Prior Mean Posterior Mean Prior Mean Posterior Mean
θi ∆iθi ∆
prior
i θi ∆iθi %i θj %i θj
λ1 25.0845 15.2038 19.5426 0.6532 θpi 0.5649 pi
nh 47.6276 27.7389 0.5148 0.9253 Atrend 0.8685 θpi
nf 186.7911 37.1511 5.3974 0.8390 θy 0.9927 ξ
Table 7: Identification at Priors and Posteriors (Parameters λ1, nh and nf)
We follow Iskrev (2010a)’s procedures and measure the identification strength, based on the
information matrix IT (θ), as sensitivity of the information derived from the likelihood to the
parameters and collinearity between the effects of different parameters on the likelihood. The
‘strength’ of identification can be decomposed into a ‘sensitivity’ and ‘correlation’ component.
The first referring to the case when weak identification arises when the moments do not change
with θi and the second when collinearity dampens the effect of θi. The former is defined as
∆i =
√
θ2i · IT (θ)(i,i)
which can also be normalised relative to the prior standard deviation for θi: σ(θi), weighting
the information matrix using the prior uncertainty:
∆priori = σ(θi) ·
√
IT (θ)(i,i)
It is possible to show the standard error of a parameter:
s.e.(θi) =
1
∆i
1√
1− %2i
where %i denotes collinearity between the effects of different parameters so that lack of identi-
fication and a flat likelihood may be due to either ∆i = 0 or %i = 1.
F Solution of Linearized Models under Imperfect Information
We write a RE model in the general non-linear form:
Et[f(yt, yt+1, yt−1, t)] = 0 (F.1)
with Et now referring to expectations subject to an information set that may be imperfect.
Either analytically, or numerically using the methods of Levine and Pearlman (2011), a log-
linearized form state-space representation can be obtained as[
zt+1
Etxt+1
]
= G
[
zt
xt
]
+H
[
Etzt
Etxt
]
+
[
B
0
]
t+1 (F.2)
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Figure 14: Identification Strength at Prior Means in Model RE-IR with Estimated
nh, nf
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Figure 15: Identification Strength at Posterior Means in Model RE-IR with Esti-
mated nh, nf
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Figure 16: Identification Strength at Prior Means in Model IR
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Figure 17: Identification Strength at Posterior Means in Model IR
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where zt, xt are vectors of backward and forward-looking variables, respectively, and t is a
vector of shock variables. We define G =
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
]
, with H similarly defined. The reason
for transforming the equations of the model from the linearized version of (F.1) is that the
corresponding solution method of Sims (2002) does not extend easily to imperfect information.
In addition we assume that agents all make the same observations at time t, which are given,
in non-linear and subsequently linearized forms respectively, by
Mobst = m(yt)
mt =
[
M1 M2
] [ zt
xt
]
+
[
L1 L2
] [ Etzt
Etxt
]
(F.3)
Note that the expressions involving Etzt,Etxt arise from rewriting the model in Blanchard-Kahn
form (F.2). The presence of these terms is what distinguishes our results on invertibility from
those of Baxter et al. (2011), and in addition we do not make the assumption that agents have
full current information on all variables for which forward expectations are present in the model.
Thus the information set at time t for all agents is {ms : s ≤ t}. For ease of notation
we assume that if any variables are observed with measurement error, then these variables are
included in the state space, and the measurement errors are then part of the vector t. Given the
fact that expectations of forward-looking variables depend on the information set, it is hardly
surprising that the absence of perfect information will impact on the path of the system. A
full derivation of the solution for the general linear setup above is provided in Pearlman et al.
(1986), but is outlined below.
F.1 Perfect Information Case
We first consider the solution for (F.2) and (F.3) under perfect information; in this case we
assume that all stocks dated t− 1 and other variables dated t in (F.2) are fully observed during
the course of period t. These would include beginning-of-period capital stock kt−1, beginning-
of-period net worth nt−1, all flows such as output, consumption, investment, all output and
factor prices, inflation over the period and all end-of-period realizations of exogenous stochastic
processes such as at, gt etc.
For this perfect information case (where Etzt = zt,Etxt = xt) there is a saddle path satisfy-
ing:
xt +Nzt = 0 where
[
N I
]
(G+H) = ΛU
[
N I
]
(F.4)
where ΛU is a matrix with unstable eigenvalues. If the number of unstable eigenvalues of (G+H)
is the same as the dimension of xt, then the system will be determinate.
16 We then ask whether
observations by the econometrician of the form (F.3) will lead to invertibility.
From the saddle path relationship (F.4), it is clear that the reduced-form representation of
16Note that in general the dimension of xt will not match the number of expectational variables in (F.1). The
algorithm in Levine and Pearlman (2011) will eliminate linear dependency among expectational variables and
will also convert the system at = ρat−1 + εt, bt = Etat+1 into at = ρat−1 + εt, bt = ρat.
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the model is now
zt = (G11 +H11 − (G12 +H12)N)zt−1 +Bt mt = (M1 + L1 − (M2 + L2)N)zt
Expressing mt in terms of zt−1 and t, from Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007) we deduce that a
necessary and sufficient condition for invertibility (see (45)) is that D˜ = EB is invertible, where
E = M1 + L1 − (M2 + L2)N .
F.2 Imperfect Information Case
We first briefly outline how the imperfect information setup is solved, and the provide the
conditions for invertibility. Following Pearlman et al. (1986), we use the Kalman filter updating
given by[
zt,t
xt,t
]
=
[
zt,t−1
xt,t−1
]
+ J
[
mt −
[
M1 M2
] [ zt,t−1
xt,t−1
]
−
[
L1 L2
] [ zt,t
xt,t
]]
where we denote zt,t ≡ Et[zt] etc. The Kalman filter was developed in the context of backward-
looking models, but extends as we see here to forward-looking models. The basic idea behind
it is that the best estimate of the states {zt, xt} based on current information is a weighted
average of the best estimate using last period’s information and the new information mt. Thus
the best estimator of the state vector at time t− 1 is updated by multiple J of the error in the
predicted value of the measurement as above, where J is given by
J =
[
PD′
−NPD′
]
Γ−1
and D ≡ M1 −M2G−122 G21, M ≡ [M1 M2] is partitioned conformably with
[
zt
xt
]
, Γ ≡ EPD′
where E ≡M1 + L1 − (M2 + L2)N and P satisfies the Riccati equation (F.2) below.
With only one imperfect information set, the same saddle path relationship (F.4) as for
perfect information holds.17 Then using the Kalman filter, the solution as derived by Pearlman
et al. (1986) 18 is given by the following processes describing the pre-determined and non-
predetermined variables zt = z˜t + zt,t−1 and xt, and a process describing the innovations z˜t ≡
zt − zt,t−1:
Predetermined : zt+1,t = Czt,t−1 + CPD′(DPD′)−1Dz˜t
Non-predetermined : xt = −Nzt,t−1 −G−122 G21z˜t − (N −G−122 G21)PD′(DPD′)−1Dz˜t
Innovations : z˜t+1 = Az˜t −APD′(DPD′)−1Dz˜t +Bt+1
where
C ≡ G11 +H11 − (G12 +H12)N, A ≡ G11 −G12G−122 G21, D ≡M1 −M2G−122 G21
17But see footnote 15 and Lubik et al. (2017) for the case of more than one imperfect information set.
18A less general solution procedure for linear models with imperfect information is in Lungu et al. (2008) with
an application to a small open economy model, which they also extend to a non-linear version.
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and P is the solution of the Riccati equation given by
P = APA′ −APD′(DPD′)−1DPA′ +BB′
where we assume that the shocks are normalized such that their covariance matrix is given by
the identity matrix.
The measurement mt, as shown by Pearlman et al. (1986), can now be expressed as
mt = Ezt,t−1 + EPD′(DPD′)−1Dz˜t
We can see that the solution procedure above is a generalization of the Blanchard-Kahn solution
for perfect information and that the determinacy of the system is independent of the choice of
a perfect or a single imperfect information information set.
F.3 When is the System Invertible?
We now pose the question: given the econometrician’s information set, under what conditions
do the RE solutions under agents’ different information sets actually differ? When can the
econometrician infer the full state vector, including shocks?
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007) do not attempt to answer this question. Their focus is on
the complete reduced form of the solution from the perspective of the econometrician; the source
of this reduced form i.e its dependence on the information set of the agents is not discussed at
all. As we have seen above, the reduced form under any information set is of the standard state
space type investigated by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007), but the invertibility properties
depend on the information set.
Levine et al. (2017b) show the following: If EB is of full rank (i.e. number of observables =
number of shocks) but D is not of full row rank, then imperfect information is not equivalent
to full information, and the system is then not invertible. This is a new result in the literature,
which says that if a limited information set under perfect information is invertible, it does not
follow that the same limited information set under imperfect information is also invertible.
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